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After much debate, the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act (QHA) was enacted in October 1998 as the first major reform to public housing in its 60-year history. In New York, the convergence of Washington reforms and local housing agendas can seriously affect the city’s capacity to house its poorer residents. The QHA is a product of Washington’s thrust toward capped funding and devolution of social programs to lower levels of government. Intended to deregulate public housing authorities (PHAs), the law grants them unprecedented flexibility, under minimal federal oversight, to address local needs. For some time, the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA), owner-manager of the city’s public housing, has sought deregulation, notably relief from “federal preferences” requiring priority admissions for families with urgent housing needs. Combined federal and local pressures may dramatically change the city’s primary low-income housing resource, 346 developments totaling 182,000 units housing 600,000 residents. (See Chart A.)
New York City’s Public Housing Among cities, New York uniquely benefits from public housing. NYCHA runs the largest program, one of seven units nationwide. The next largest, in Chicago, is one-fourth its size. Within the city, public housing is a major rental sector, comprising one out of 12 units in a tight, high-cost rental market. NYCHA holds a national reputation as a “high-performing” authority. Its high-rise developments counter the negative images of “housing of last resort” elsewhere. They are fully occupied, with open spaces that appear well used and well kept. A long-standing “mixed-income” admissions policy has contributed to community diversity. Nearly half of resident households have incomes above the federal poverty level (45 %) and are not on public assistance (47%); and over one-third (35 %) are working families. Although African Americans and Latinos dominate, with whites underrepresented, one out of five developments is integrated into census tracts containing a majority white population. (See Chart B.)
Residents are often critical of NYCHA management, but they prize their housing and communities. A growing citywide waiting list --120,000 families, with a wait averaging eight years -- attests that lower-income New Yorkers seek the opportunity to move into, not out of, public housing. The immediate question is whether federal and local policy will preserve the city’s public housing and build on its strengths. The Quality Housing Act Framed by a regressive Congress, the draft bills preceding the QHA contained extreme provisions. The cornerstone 1937 Housing Act was targeted for repeal, as was the Brooke Amendment, which caps rents at 30 percent of household income. Echoing welfare reform, time limits on tenancy were seriously considered. Removal of “good cause” protections threatened eviction at the authority’s pleasure when leases expired. Advocates succeeded in gutting the worst proposals, but a “work responsibility” provision passed, requiring able-bodied, adult residents who are not employed, in training, or students to contribute eight hours of community service monthly. The QHA’s key provisions offer housing authorities greater flexibility while they impose new federal restrictions.
Major Impacts in New York City
If, over the next 10 years, NYCHA meets only the minimal targets required by the QHA, an estimated 10,000 to 16,000 units will be lost to the poor (below 30 percent of AMI). This estimate assumes annual turnover at 4.5 percent at all income levels and depends on the extent to which NYCHA provides vouchers instead of apartments. Losses will be moderated by the court-ordered Davis consent decree, while it stands, which retains federal preferences in developments with past discrimination. Further losses may result from NYCHA plans for demolition, sale, or redevelopment. In the past year, NYCHA proposed three HUD HOPE VI projects involving demolition, without replacement, of low-income units in Central Brooklyn and the South Bronx.
PHA policies can also force out low-income families, opening vacated units to higher rents. Hard-line eviction policies bear down on low-income residents most at risk of rent delinquency, criminal involvement of household members, or noncompliance with community service. NYCHA has been actively lobbying the state for special procedures to accelerate evictions. Further displacement will follow NYCHA’s HOPE VI demolition plans, as low-income residents relocate to other public housing or to vouchered private units, with only promises of right to return. Mutual gains for residents and PHAs can be realized through job-related programs that raise employment and incomes and, therefore, rents. In addition to “earned income disregards,” stronger NYCHA implementation of Section 3 -- a long-standing federal provision requiring HUD funds be used to maximize job creation among residents -- has potential. NYCHA’s multi-billion dollar annual operations offer major opportunities.
One key objective of the QHA, however, is to say “no more” to public housing, indeed, to have less of it. PHAs are prohibited from increasing the housing stock they own. One-to-one replacement of demolished units is abolished. Instead, public-private partnerships are promoted, permitting PHAs to invest federal funds in private “mixed-finance” developments in return for leased units. The parallel HOPE VI program encourages PHAs to demolish distressed developments and undertake entrepreneurial redevelopment. A recent NYCHA proposal targeted several developments with market potential for upscale treatment: Ceiling rents would be phased out and vacant units reserved for working families. As buildings become self-supporting and saleable, unneeded operating subsidies would be channeled into mixed-finance projects. NYCHA views this strategy as “expanding the pie,” but the pie shrinks for low-income families who lose access to public housing. For those offered private NYCHA-leased units, what happens after 10 or 20 years if owners decide not to renew expiring leases is a pressing question that now besets both HUD-subsidized and Mitchell-Lama housing.
In New York, the prospects for effective resident involvement seem dim. NYCHA has designated as its RAB the existing resident advisory structure -- ICOP, the Interim Council of Presidents. Formed in 1992, ICOP consists of nine district chairs, each elected by resident association presidents from developments in the district -- three districts in Brooklyn, two each in Manhattan and the Bronx, and one each in Queens and Staten Island. ICOP has a reputation of being ineffective and unassertive. As of early 1999, NYCHA had not convened a citywide ICOP meeting in two years, a period of unprecedented policy change for public housing. The information gap led resident leaders to form an independent citywide organization -- the New York City Public Housing Resident Alliance -- to fill the vacuum. Other questions abound. Does ICOP comply with HUD regulations? Can a nine-member RAB effectively represent 182,000 households? Are districts disproportionate? Manhattan-North has 28,000 households in 50 developments; Staten Island 5,000 households in 11 developments. The shift of federal and local agendas toward serving higher income tenants and promoting private ventures puts a premium on effective resident involvement and NYCHA accountability. Long-standing assumptions that NYCHA interests coincide with those of resident and waiting list families need to be checked if the strengths of New York’s public housing are to be preserved.
Congress should:
NYCHA should:
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